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THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS: PAST FAILURES, 
PRESENT SOLUTIONS 
MORSE TAN* 
ABSTRACT 
North Korea has recently announced that it has developed nuclear 
weapons and has pulled out of the six-party talks.  These events do not emerge 
out of a vacuum, and this Article lends perspective through an 
interdisciplinary lens that seeks to grapple with the complexities and provide 
constructive approaches based on this well-researched understanding.  This 
Article analyzes political, military, historical, legal and other angles of this 
international crisis. 
Past dealings with North Korea have been unfruitful because other nations 
do not recognize the ties between North Korean acts and its ideology and 
objectives.  For a satisfactory resolution to the current crisis, South Korea and 
the United States must maintain sufficient deterrence, focus on multi-lateral 
and international avenues, and increase the negative and later positive 
incentives for North Korean compliance with its international obligations. 
From an international legal and international organizations perspective, 
the multilateral talks can be bolstered by inclusion of the U.N. Secretary 
General as a proactive mediator.  The Secretary General can call for, if 
necessary and after the failure of other means, U.N. Security Council action 
and the reinstitution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to do 
its duly constituted work of preventing proliferation.  If these approaches 
succeed, the peninsula, region, and world will become better places. 
 
* Morse Tan, Senior Research Fellow, the University of Texas School of Law.  Thanks to faculty 
members of the University of Texas (Profs. Karen Engle, Derek Jinks, and Larry Sager), 
Pepperdine Catholic, and Texas Southern for their comments and questions during presentations 
of these materials.  Thanks as well to Dr. Jeff Todd, Anna Sabayrac, Jeff Heiderscheit, and 
Jessica Ho.  My gratitude also to the students in my International Organizations class, in which 
we contemplated the North Korean situation as a case study.  Finally, thanks to Assistant 
Secretary of State Christopher Hill for his interest in this article and his efforts to resolve the real-
life crisis. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann changed the course of 
history through the small but stupendous act of splitting a uranium atom.1  The 
devastating power of an atomic bomb itself came about through the efforts of 
American nuclear scientists through the Manhattan Project.2  A particular 
isotope of uranium, U235, accounts for nuclear possibilities.3  This atom, when 
hit by a neutron, emits one or more neutrons along with energy as it breaks 
apart into two pieces.  This process is known as fission.4  A successive chain 
reaction can take place under the proper parameters.5  When one controls this 
chain reaction so that the rate of fission remains constant, nuclear energy 
results.6 
Many nations, including North Korea, make use of nuclear fission to 
generate electricity.7  In 1993, contrary to the terms of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it had signed, North Korea refused to allow 
inspections of one of its nuclear facilities, which the United States, Japan, and 
South Korea suspected of processing nuclear materials for weapons.8  For the 
next eighteen months, North Korea played a game of nuclear brinkmanship—
keeping inspectors at arm’s length, threatening to withdraw totally from the 
NPT, agreeing to and withdrawing from talks, and increasing the vehemence of 
its propaganda to threaten war in the face of proposed sanctions—to try to 
secure more economic aid and political leverage against the United States.9  B. 
K. Gills writes that the nuclear crisis was on a “trajectory toward war” until 
Jimmy Carter, of his own accord, brokered a deal that removed the sanction 
threat if North Korea agreed to inspections, thus averting the crisis.10 
Ten years later, however, not only has North Korea violated its pledge not 
to develop nuclear weapons, it has brazenly declared to the world that it 
 
 1. HARALAMBOS ATHANASOPULOS, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 
(2000). 
 2. Id.; Geoffrey P. Hammond, Nuclear Energy into the Twenty-first Century, 54 APPLIED 
ENERGY 327, 328 (1996). 
 3. Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation 
Regime To Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 71, 77 (1995). 
 4. Id. at 77–78. 
 5. Id. at 78. 
 6. Id. at 77–78. 
 7. B. K. GILLS, KOREA VERSUS KOREA: A CASE OF CONTESTED LEGITIMACY 235–36 
(Michale Liefer, ed., 1996); see also Hammond, supra note 2. 
 8. GILLS, supra note 7, at 236. 
 9. Id. at 236–39. 
 10. Id. at 240–43; William M. Drennan, Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s 
Coercing Whom?, in THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 157, 159 (Robert J. Art & 
Patrick M. Cronin eds., 2003). 
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already possesses such weapons.11  Analysts attribute North Korea’s desire for 
weapons to several factors, such as deterrence against a perceived Western 
threat,12 a bargaining chip to gain political and economic advantages,13 or as a 
natural extension of the national ideology.14  No matter the reason, atomic 
weapons in the hands of a nation with a stated goal to reunite the Korean 
Peninsula by force, a nation that has violated all of its major international 
agreements, a nation with missile systems capable of reaching South Korea, 
Japan, and possibly even the United States, are greatly opposed by these 
nations.15 
This situation is worsened by North Korea’s refusal to engage in multi-
nation talks that include South Korea, the United States, and Japan, plus North 
Korea’s own traditional allies China and Russia.16  Many analysts view these 
talks as the best prospect for lasting solutions.17  Instead, North Korea wants to 
bypass South Korea, the nation with the most at stake, and deal with the United 
States directly.18  Although the United States currently opposes bilateral talks, 
an effective strategy to address the complexities of the current crisis has yet to 
emerge.19 
For the past fifty years, North Korea has lied, broken its word, and pushed 
tensions to the brink of war, and negotiations with this country have routinely 
been unproductive, if not outright failures.20  With nuclear weapons in the 
equation, though, the need for effective solutions has never been greater.  At 
the same time, one scholar has called nuclear diplomacy with North Korea “a 
dead-end street.”21  With these risks in the background, this Paper presents the 
history of North Korean relations with other countries, explores current actions 
 
 11. See Michael Duffy, What Does North Korea Want?, TIME, Feb. 21, 2005, at 23 
(reporting that “[d]ays before his 63rd birthday,” Kim Jong-Il’s government announced that, “as 
has long been suspected by U.S. intelligence, North Korea has indeed built nuclear weapons ‘for 
self-defense’”); Timeline: N. Korea Nuclear Dispute, CNN.COM, Sept. 28, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/nkorea.timeline/ [hereinafter Timeline]; Paul 
Kerr, North Korea Chronology, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, June 2003, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/nkoreachron_june03.asp. 
 12. See, e.g., DANIEL A. PINKSTON ET AL., CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, 
MONTEREY INST. OF INT’L STUDIES, SPECIAL REPORT ON THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS STATEMENT (2005), available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050211.htm. 
 13. North Korea’s Threat, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2005, at A18. 
 14. See Sung-Yoon Lee, Global Pressure Point: Nuclear Diplomacy vis-à-vis the DPRK: A 
Dead-End Street, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 151, 155–58 (2003). 
 15. See, e.g., PINKSTON ET AL., supra note 12. 
 16. Id.; North Korea’s Threat, supra note 13. 
 17. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 14, at 158, 160–65; North Korea’s Threat, supra note 13. 
 18. See North Korea’s Threat, supra note 13. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Lee, supra note 14, at 155–57. 
 21. Id. at 152. 
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and international responses, and offers solutions, with a focus on the 
application of international legal instruments and organizations. 
II.  BACKGROUND: KOREA DIVIDED AND NORTH KOREA AS ROGUE STATE 
A. History of the Division 
1. Korean Conflict 
After finding itself no longer under the ignominy of the Japanese colonial 
period (which lasted from 1905 to the end of World War II),22 Korea moved 
into a different sort of problem.  The Soviet Union, after a period of relative 
inaction, decided to actively pursue military efforts at the end of World War II 
in order to strengthen its hand during post-war settlements.23  The Soviets 
poured south into Manchuria.24  The resulting U.S.–Soviet agreement, contrary 
to the will of the Korean people, split this small peninsula into the U.S.-aligned 
South Korea and the Soviet-aligned North Korea, with the Soviets agreeing to 
push no further south than the 38th parallel.25 
Border skirmishes ensued over the next few years until, on the early 
morning of June 25th, 1950, North Korean forces embarked on a full-scale war 
by launching out over the 38th parallel.26  Premier Kim Il Sung had eight full 
divisions (135,000 troops) at his disposal; many of these soldiers fought 
previously in World War II.27  By contrast, South Korea counted only 95,000 
generally less-seasoned soldiers.28 
The North Korean divisions drove deep into South Korea, overmatching 
the smaller South Korean forces, who were pushed down to the Pusan 
Perimeter, a relatively small swath of land at the southernmost tip of the 
 
 22. See MAX HASTINGS, THE KOREAN WAR 25–26 (1987); see also Michael Hickey, The 
Korean War: An Overview, BBC ONLINE, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/coldwar/ 
korea_hickey_01.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2005); HENRY CHUNG, KOREA AND THE UNITED 
STATES THROUGH WAR AND PEACE 43–85 (2000). 
 23. ROBERT J. MYERS, KOREA IN THE CROSS CURRENTS 78–79 (2001); CHUNG, supra note 
22, at 97–108. 
 24. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 103–05; MYERS, supra note 23, at 78. 
 25. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 109–24; MYERS, supra note 23, at 78–79; M.P. SRIVASTAVA, 
THE KOREAN CONFLICT: SEARCH FOR UNIFICATION 23–33 (1982). 
 26. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 155; BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA’S PLACE IN THE SUN: A 
MODERN HISTORY 260 (1997). 
 27. UNITED STATES ARMY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MILITARY HISTORY, AMERICAN 
MILITARY HISTORY 545 (1973). 
 28. Id. at 546. 
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peninsula.29  The North Korean troops made full use of their advantages of 
surprise and initiative.30 
As the North steamrolled the South, the United States called upon the U.N. 
Security Council to take action against North Korean aggression.31  The 
Security Council, with the approbation of support of forty-four out of forty-
nine U.N. member states, called upon its members to send military and other 
assistance: sixteen states sent soldiers and twenty-five total countries provided 
materials and other assistance.32  General Douglas MacArthur stepped forward 
as the U.N. commander of the combined forces.33 
MacArthur lead a key counter-initiative known as the Inchon Landing, a 
tricky military maneuver due to the tides.34  By the middle of September 1950, 
MacArthur’s forces not only plowed back to the 38th parallel, they continued 
on north.35  As the U.N. forces proceeded closer to the North Korean–Chinese 
border, Chinese soldiers poured into North Korea, driving the U.N. forces 
back.36  After two more pushes, one northward by the U.N. troops and one 
southward by the Chinese, the battle lines hardened for two more years back 
where they started—the 38th parallel.37 
2. Armistice Agreement 
With a military draw by mid-1951, the two sides negotiated for the next 
two years, resulting in the Korean Armistice Agreement (“Armistice 
Agreement”), signed on July 27, 1953.38  The head of the North Korean 
military and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.N. Command signed this 
Armistice Agreement.39 
 
 29. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 169. 
 30. But see CUMINGS, supra note 26, at 261–63.  South Korean intelligence expected an 
attack on the Ongjin peninsula, which was repulsed—the surprise may have been that the attack 
continued and was more widespread than the Ongjin peninsula.  See id. 
 31. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 158–59; SRIVASTAVA, supra note 25, at 37–45. 
 32. Hickey, supra note 22; CHUNG, supra note 22, at 160–62; CHI YOUNG PAK, KOREA AND 
THE UNITED NATIONS 78 (2000). 
 33. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 165–66. 
 34. Id. at 170–77. 
 35. CUMINGS, supra note 26, at 275–78. 
 36. See Hickey, supra note 22; CUMINGS, supra note 26, at 284–86. 
 37. See Hickey, supra note 22; CUMINGS, supra note 26, at 289. 
 38. CHUNG, supra note 22, at 300–02.  Note that South Korea had no desire to sign an 
armistice and had to be persuaded to sign by President Eisenhower, largely through repeated 
assurances that the United States was committed to unifying Korea.  Id. at 290, 296–98. 
 39. See MYERS, supra note 23, at 93.  The Armistice Agreement is a purely military 
document with no national signatories.  Military Armistice in Korea and Temporary 
Supplementary Agreement, U.S.–N. Korea–P.R.C., July 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 235 [hereinafter 
Armistice Agreement]. 
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While this Armistice Agreement called for a cease-fire, it was not a peace 
treaty.40  The Armistice Agreement established the military line of 
demarcation, and the demilitarized zone (DMZ).41  The Military Armistice 
Commission oversees this agreement.42 
The Armistice Agreement, intended as a temporary measure by its own 
terms, was supposed to be replaced by a peace treaty through a conference 
convening within three months after the Armistice Agreement.43  While a 
treaty emerging from the conference was supposed to settle the remaining 
issues, such as withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and a new peace for 
the Land of the Morning Calm, this anticipated peace treaty did not come 
about as planned.  Due to this failure, the two Koreas instead signed the 
Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and 
Cooperation between North and South towards the end of 1991, and the Joint 
Declaration by South and North Korea of the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula in 1992.44 
B. North Korea as Rogue State45 
1. History of Hostile Actions 
Notwithstanding the Armistice, the U.S. Congressional Research Service 
has documented some 124 provocations by North Korea against the United 
States, South Korea, and/or Japan from June 1950 to March 2003.46  They have 
ranged from multiple assassination attempts on South Korean presidents,47 to 
 
 40. Cecilia Y. Oh, Comment, The Effect of Reunification of North and South Korea on 
Treaty Status, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2002). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Armistice Agreement, supra note 39, at art. II(A)–(B). 
 43. See id. at art. IV; CHUNG, supra note 22, at 300. 
 44. See Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation 
Between the South and the North, available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31012.htm 
(entered into force Feb. 19, 1992); Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, N. Korea–S. Korea, Jan. 20, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 569, available at http://www.state.gov/ 
t/ac/rls/or/2004/31011.htm. 
 45. “Rogue state” is the actual designation that the Clinton administration placed on the 
North Korean regime.  Analysis: The New Boogeymen, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 12, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/1376425.stm. 
 46. DICK K. NANTO, REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
NORTH KOREA: CHRONOLOGY OF PROVOCATIONS, 1950–2003 (2003), available at 
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30004.pdf.  See generally THE INST. FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES, 
FOREIGN POLICY FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION (1975) (tracking the South Korean–Japanese 
relationship during the early 1970s); KOREAN UNIFICATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (C.I. 
Eugene Kim ed., 1973). 
 47. NANTO, supra note 46, at 8–9.  One assassination plot succeeded in killing the wife of 
President Park Chung-hee only two days before the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo.  Id. at 6; see 
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the infiltration of thousands of armed agents involved in kidnapping and 
terrorism,48 from the mid-air bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 
passenger plane in 198749 to the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo, a surveillance 
ship.50 
There have been various air and naval encounters over the years.  In April 
1969, North Korean MiG jet fighters destroyed a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance 
plane over the Sea of Japan, taking thirty-one lives.51  This unarmed plane was 
flying about ninety miles off the North Korean coast.52  As recently as March 
2003, four North Korean fighters intercepted an American Air Force 
reconnaissance plane in international airspace above the Sea of Japan.53  “The 
North Korean Navy has captured and detained numerous South Korean 
merchant ships that have entered North Korea’s territorial sea.”54 
2. Military Sales 
North Korea has aggressively exported ballistic missile technology during 
the course of several decades.55  North Korea has sold this technology to 
countries such as Libya,56 Pakistan, Syria, Egypt, Iran, and the United Arab 
Emirates,57 grossing hundreds of millions of dollars per year, its largest source 
 
also ROBERT S. LITWAK, ROGUE STATES AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONTAINMENT AFTER THE 
COLD WAR 202 (2000). 
 48. “From 1954 to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed 
agents into South Korea . . . .”  NANTO, supra note 46, at Summary.  See Richard P. Cronin, The 
North Korean Nuclear Threat and the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance: Perceived Interests, 
Approaches, and Prospects, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 51, 52 (2005), for more on the 
kidnapping of Japanese nationals by North Korea. 
 49. NANTO, supra note 46, at 10.  The plane was traveling from Baghdad to Seoul.  Twenty 
crew members and ninety-five passengers died.  This egregious act sought to discourage 
participation in the Seoul Olympics.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 4.  The North Koreans held the crew of eighty-three prisoners for eleven months.  
Id.; see also LITWAK, supra note 47, at 202. 
 51. NANTO, supra note 46, at 5. 
 52. Id.; see also LITWAK, supra note 47, at 202. 
 53. NANTO, supra note 46, at 25. 
 54. Stephen Kong, Comment, The Right of Innocent Passage: A Case Study on Two Koreas, 
11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 373, 375–76 (2002). 
 55. See JOSEPH S. BERMUDEZ, JR., MONTEREY INST. OF INT’L STUDIES, CTR. FOR 
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, A HISTORY OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IN THE DPRK 
18–19 (1999), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/op2.pdf. 
 56. Libya recently relinquished tons of uranium likely supplied to it by North Korea.  See 
William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, After Ending Arms Program, Libya Receives a Surprise, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A6. 
 57. BERMUDEZ, supra note 55, at 1.  According to the U.S. Weapons Inspector David Kay, 
in an interesting twist of events, Kim Jong-Il defrauded Saddam Hussein out of $10 million in a 
deal that Kim failed to fulfill.  The contract included ballistic missile technology and other 
verboten missile equipment before the Second Gulf War.  Bob Drogin, Botched Iraqi Arms Deal 
Is Detailed, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2003, at A1. 
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of hard currency.58  North Korea’s financial stake in the development and sale 
of missile technology drives its economy.59 
In October of 2002, North Korea threatened to resume long-range missile 
tests and a higher level of weapons proliferation to other countries.60  This 
activity falls in line with the intermediate range ballistic missiles supplied to 
Pakistan in the 1990s.61  It is thought that in the late 1990s North Korea 
furnished Pakistan with twelve to twenty-five complete No-Dong medium 
range missiles.62  Ominously, North Korea gained from Pakistan uranium 
enrichment technology, which it can use (and may have already used) for 
producing nuclear weapons.63 
Such proliferation efforts have continued.  For example, a North Korean 
vessel transported Scud missiles to Yemen in December of 2002.64  A 
spokesman for the Nigerian government indicated that a North Korean 
delegation showed the Nigerian government a catalogue of weapons—but that 
Nigeria had not made a definite commitment to purchase them yet.65 
3. Biological and Chemical Weapons in North Korea 
North Korea joined the Biological Weapons Convention, an international 
treaty that for the most part does not even permit possession of biological 
weapons.66  However, it appears that North Korea has developed biological 
weapons such as anthrax, yellow fever, and the plague.67 
 
 58. See Andrew Ward, Trade Ties Grow Between the Two Koreas, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Dec. 10, 2003, at 2; see also Douglas Frantz, N. Korea’s Nuclear Success Is Doubted, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A1. 
 59. See, e.g., Bertil Lintner, North Korea’s Missile Trade Helps Fund Its Nuclear Program, 
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, May 5, 2003, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1546. 
 60. See LARRY A. NIKSCH, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS PROGRAM 2 (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf. 
 61. See id. at 1. 
 62. BERMUDEZ, supra note 55, at 24. 
 63. See Nuclear Duplicity from Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at A20. 
 64. Lintner, supra note 59. 
 65. Editorial, Missiles for Sale: North Korea Spreading Weapons Technology to Largest 
African Nation, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Jan. 30, 2004, at 10A. 
 66. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 
U.S.T. 585 [hereinafter Biological Warfare Convention].  North Korea joined on March 13, 1987.  
See id. 
 67. Federation of American Scientists, North Korea Special Weapons Guide: Biological 
Weapons Program, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/bw/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 
2005). 
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Unlike the Biological Weapons Convention, North Korea did not sign the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.68  Consistent with its refusal to sign, North 
Korea has a formidable assemblage of such weapons.69  North Korean military 
doctrine asserts the use of chemical weapons as standard weaponry, which 
makes the use of chemical weapons in a fashion akin to conventional weapons 
a looming concern.70  The choice not to sign the Chemical Weapons 
Convention involved conflict within the regime and illustrates the dominance 
of military considerations in the country.71 
III.  THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH NORTH KOREA 
A. Projections Regarding Another Korean War 
Military planners project that in the event of a North Korean full-scale 
invasion, the first several months of conflict could see some 300,000 to half a 
million casualties in the South Korean and U.S. militaries, as well as additional 
“hundreds of thousands of” civilian casualties.72  According to Doug Bandow 
 
 68. Convention on Chemical Weapons: Hearing on Treaty Doc. 103–21 Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 2 (1996) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations). 
 69. North Korea is purported to possess the technology to produce nerve, blister, choking, 
and blood agents in large quantities.  It already has copious stockpiles of sarin and mustard gas, 
as well as blood agents, choking gases, VX, and riot control agents in unknown amounts.  In all, 
U.S. intelligence reports—as a low figure—some 180–250 tons of chemical weapons.  High 
estimates place the figure at between 2,500 to 5,000 tons.  DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE, U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND 
ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS, Jan. 1 through June 30, 2001, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2001.htm; Federation of American Scientists, 
North Korea Special Weapons Guide: Chemical Weapons Program, http://www.fas.org/nuke/ 
guide/dprk/cw/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, PROLIFERATION: THREAT 
AND RESPONSE (1996), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/ne_asia.html; 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea Profile Chemical Overview, http://www.nti.org/ 
e_research/profiles/NK/Chemical/index.html. 
 70. See generally Attack Across the DMZ Special Report, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REV., Apr. 
1, 1994, at 22 [hereinafter DMZ Special Report]. 
 71. This confrontation took place between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the 
Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces (MPAF).  SUNG CHULL KIM ET AL., NORTH KOREA IN 
CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF REGIME SUSTAINABILITY 58 (1997).  The MFA briefed Kim Jong-Il 
on the tactical value of signing the Chemical Weapons Convention.  Id.  However, rather than 
take the MFA’s advice, the Deputy Minister of the MFA had to complete a full year 
“revolutionization course” before he could resume his post.  Id.  The reason for this punishment 
was the violation of reporting rules.  Id. 
 72. R. Jeffrey Smith, North Korea Deal Urged by State Dept., WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1993, 
at A15; Drennan, supra note 10, at 191; PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS, CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION 
STUDIES, MILITARY OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM (Jan. 
27, 2003), http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm. 
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of the Cato Institute, total casualties for such a war could exceed one million.73  
Oplan 5027, the U.S. military’s plan for the region, anticipates massive attacks 
on Seoul with artillery and rockets, possibly turning Seoul into a “sea of fire” 
through launching up to half a million shells per hour.74  A pre-emptive strike 
on North Korea could result in a counter-attack by North Korea that would 
inflict huge levels of casualties and damage before the South Korean and U.S. 
military could do much to block such attacks75 or pre-emptively defang the 
North Korean military by military force.76  While analysts typically project an 
eventual South Korean/American victory, this victory would come at a great 
price;77 some might call it a Pyrrhic victory. 
There exists a more devious possibility that North Korea has hinted at by 
firing missiles over Japan, kidnapping Japanese citizens, and other hostile 
actions: North Korea could attack U.S. bases in Japan.78  In this scenario, 
North Korea would probably seek to fray or split the alliance between the U.S. 
and South Korea, and possibly move towards uniting the two Koreas.79  Given 
the rising anti-U.S. sentiment, especially among the younger generations of 
South Koreans, the tilt in the South Korean government towards socialism, the 
friendly overtures of South Korea (both governmental and private) to North 
Korea, the prevalent pro-North Korean and anti-American media bias, North 
Korean infiltrations in South Korea, and the strong desire of the Korean 
populace to unite, such a scheme takes on increased credibility.80 
Regardless of whether or not North Korea attacks U.S. military bases in 
Japan, it can still attack, or threaten to attack, Japanese targets.  In one 
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 76. North Korea’s military assets are very numerous.  Id.  To make it even more difficult, 
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functional in small, underground facilities.  Id.; see also North Korean Missile Proliferation: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Security, Proliferation, and Fed. Services of the S. Comm. 
on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. 6–7 (1997) (statement of Choi Ju-Hwal, Former Official, 
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not fixed ones, it is assumed that the North does not have fixed rocket launchers”). 
 77. See DMZ Special Report, supra note 70; see also Linda D. Kozaryn, Despite Progress, 
North Korea Poses Major Threat, AM. FORCES INFO. SERVICE NEWS ARTICLES, Apr. 3, 2001, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2001/n04032001_200104031.html; Eleanor Hall, North 
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 78. See Hall, supra note 77. 
 79. Id. 
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conceivable scenario, North Korea can blitzkrieg the South, and then threaten 
to destroy major Japanese cities if the United States sends reinforcements.  
North Korea seeks to weaken America’s will to defend South Korea, foment 
favorable political conditions in South Korea, and then wage war to distract its 
own populace from its extensive woes.81  Official North Korean policy 
maintains the objective of re-unifying Korea by force; it considers a violent 
Communist revolution of the South to be its manifest destiny.82 
South Korea, for many reasons—including economic, political, historical 
and humanitarian—has strong incentives to avoid the outbreak of another war 
on the Korean peninsula.83  In one form or another, war does not present itself 
as an attractive option. 
B. Resources 
1. North Korean Military 
The North Korean situation requires a delicate balance.  At one extreme, 
the risk of war, which would prove disastrous for the entire peninsula; and at 
the other extreme, the risk of blackmail and exploitation, in which North Korea 
would receive benefits that it would divert for its own devious ends.  It is 
advisable to explore both extremes in order to find the parameters for the best 
solutions.  This section of the Article focuses on the extreme of potential war. 
The devastating capabilities North Korea possesses must be kept in mind.  
In conventional weapons alone, it is one of the leading countries in the world 
in total number of military units.84  While it may be accurately stated that some 
of these units are not the most state-of-the-art weapons available, the sheer 
overwhelming numbers nonetheless make North Korea appear a menacing foe 
indeed.  North Korea has many artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles pointed 
and ready to turn the city of Seoul into rubble.85  North Korea boasts the ability 
to field approximately five to seven million troops; it already has about 
1,000,000 soldiers in its standing forces, 120,000 special operation forces, 
 
 81. See Lee, supra note 14, at 154–55 (describing the North’s power with respect to the 
South, Japan, and the United States). 
 82. See id. at 156–58. 
 83. See, e.g., SAUNDERS, supra note 72 (speculating on the negative consequences to South 
Korea, both physical and political, should war break out). 
 84. See generally Kathleen T. Rhem, North Korean Military ‘Very Credible Conventional 
Force,’ AM. FORCES INFO. SERVICE NEWS ARTICLES, Nov. 18, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/Nov2003/n11182003200311181.html. 
 85. Seoul, one of the most populous cities in the world, contains about a quarter of South 
Korea’s population.  See Wikipedia, Seoul, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/seoul (last visited Oct. 
16, 2005); THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 793 (2005).  It sits not more than 30 
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11,000 forward deployed artillery pieces, 1,700 aircraft, 800 ships, 500 170-
millimeter guns, 200 multiple-launch rocket systems, 62 submarines, cave and 
underground bases, air defense weapons, mobile missile launchers, and other 
potential causes of military mayhem.86 
One of the questions that remains is what sort of missile delivery 
technology does North Korea possess, and is that technology sufficient to 
deliver a nuclear warhead to the United States of America?  It is safe to say 
that North Korea presently has the missile delivery technology to strike South 
Korea and Japan, and, if they so foolishly desired, to strike various parts of 
China as well.87  The huge population densities of both South Korea and Japan 
would make such weapons, especially nuclear weapons, particularly 
destructive as they would take more lives per square mile than other locales—
due to the greater number of people per unit of area. 
While the might of the U.S. military would likely be able to eventually win 
or at least maintain or return to the status quo in a fight against North Korea 
alone, it would probably do so at great cost.  The cost of human lives and 
property on the Korean peninsula could dwarf the casualties suffered during 
the first Korean War. 
Additionally, and more alarming, is the possibility for another Korean war 
to draw in China.88  After all, during the Korean War, it was the Chinese forces 
that turned back the U.N. forces as they were approaching the Yalu River near 
the Chinese border.89  China would want to maintain North Korea as a buffer 
between it and South Korea, both geographically and ideologically.90 
2. The U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula 
a. Nuclear 
The U.S. nuclear presence in Korea has steadily dwindled to none.  In 
1967, the United States had 2,600 nuclear weapons in Korea and Okinawa.91  
 
 86. See Hall, supra note 77; Kozaryn, supra note 77 (North Korea has six million reservists); 
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(1999). 
 90. See id. 
 91. Robert S. Norris et al., Where They Were, 55 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 26, 26–35 
(1999), available at http://www.thebulletin.org/print.php?art_ofn=nd99norris_024.  See generally 
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The number of nuclear weapons in Korea decreased to 151 by 1985,92 and in 
1991, the United States removed all of its nuclear weapons from Korea.93  
However, because the United States has long-range delivery systems, the 
presence of nuclear weapons in Korea—or even Asia—carries less significance 
than if the United States had only mid-range or short-range delivery abilities.94 
b. Conventional 
The U.S. Army has about 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea.95  These 
troops have ample equipment, such as Apache helicopters and Patriot missile 
batteries.96  The largest forward-deployed fleet of the Navy, the 7th Fleet, rests 
not far from the shores of North Korea.97  Around 200 aircraft, forty to fifty 
ships,98 and some 20,000 Navy and Marine personnel constitute the 7th Fleet.99  
Air Force deployment in the Pacific numbers 45,000 military and civilian 
personnel—with about 300 fighter and attack aircraft under its control.100  The 
Seventh Air Force perches in Korea with the Fifth in Japan.101 
These forces in the Pacific, some in and around Korea and Japan, can 
respond rapidly to an outbreak of hostilities.  At the same time, the ability to 
quickly deploy additional military resources enables rapid reinforcement of the 
present numbers. 
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3. South Korean Resources 
a. Military 
With mandatory military service for male citizens, South Korea can 
mobilize approximately 4,500,000 well-equipped soldiers with newer 
armaments than their North Korean counterparts, such as more than 3,000 
tanks and 1,500 strike aircraft.102  Approximately 5,300 mortars and two 
surface-to-surface battalions add to the South Korean military resources.103 
b. Economic 
The robust South Korean economy, once the second to poorest at the end 
of the Korean War, now stands as the 11th largest economy in the world, with 
a per capita G.N.P. of U.S. $14,000.104  It would have large capabilities to 
sustain a war effort, if those capabilities would not already find themselves 
devastated by a North Korean attack.  However, after another war with North 
Korea, the South Korean economy might end up flattened even more than after 
the first Korean War105 because there exists more to destroy—whether 
infrastructure, industry, edifices, or people. 
C. Kim Jong-Il106 
At the other extreme from full-out warfare are the problems that result 
from deceit and blackmail in the political arena.  In the case of North Korea, 
politics flow from the top—North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il.107  Early 
intelligence wrongfully assessed Kim Jong-Il as unintelligent.  Later 
intelligence corrected this earlier assessment, and concluded instead that Kim 
possesses a high-powered intellect.  Estimates of his I.Q. have placed it at 
around 150.108 
 
 102. Kozaryn, supra note 77. 
 103. Orders of Battle and Major Equipment South Korea and North Korea, 
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Kim Il Sung groomed his son Kim Jong-Il to take the reins of power from 
him starting in the early 1970s.109  As Korean Workers Party Secretary, Kim 
Jong-Il ran the organization, including its propaganda function.110  In 1980, the 
Sixth Party Congress named him the official successor.111  In 1991, Kim Jong-
Il ascended to the position of Supreme Commander of the People’s Army, and 
in 1993, he rose to Chairman of the National Defense Committee.112  
Throughout this time, propaganda deifying Kim Jong-Il drummed its way into 
the day-to-day life of North Korea.113 
According to defectors from North Korea itself, the North Korean 
populace, in spite of the propaganda, is aware of Kim Jong-Il’s immoral 
behavior, the failure of his economic policies, and the politicized nature of his 
inner circle.114  The deterioration of the country on many fronts would tend to 
diminish the glorified image of this totalitarian dictator.115 
IV.  THE PRESENT CRISIS 
A. History of the Geneva Protocol 
The 1994 Agreed Framework116 resulted from intensive negotiations, and 
marked a departure from the otherwise relatively uniform policy of the Clinton 
administration toward what it termed “rogue states.”117  U.S. policy towards 
North Korea, dubbed “limited engagement by necessity,” emerged out of 
heated discussion and debate, both within the Clinton administration and also 
within the Republican-led Congress.118  During this debate, policymakers 
considered a range of options, including preemptive strikes against the known 
nuclear facilities, proposed sanctions, and a negotiated agreement with North 
Korea.119  Nothing more than a focused preemptive attack solely on the nuclear 
facilities carried with it, even according to the military leaders at the time, too 
much risk of a full-blown war.120  The Clinton administration had actually 
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started pursuing the sanctions option when a visit to Pyongyang by former 
president Jimmy Carter renewed negotiation efforts.121 
With the reluctant permission of President Clinton (permission that 
President George H.W. Bush had previously refused to give), Jimmy Carter 
went on a peacemaking mission to Pyongyang.122  Upon Carter’s return, he 
pronounced the end of the crisis, with Kim Il Sung agreeing to freeze North 
Korea’s nuclear program under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspections, and his willingness to come back to the bargaining table with the 
then-current U.S. administration.123  This trip served as a catalyst for the 
negotiations that led to the Geneva Protocol, also known as the Agreed 
Framework.124 
The planned initial meeting between the DPRK and the United States in 
Geneva found itself suspended due to the demise of Kim Il Sung, the self-
styled “Great Leader” who had ruled North Korea from its inception until July 
9, 1994.125  After a one-month delay, the negotiation resumed.  A joint 
statement emerged on August 12, which announced the core of the 
agreement.126  U.S. Ambassador Gallucci and North Korea’s First Vice 
Foreign Minister concluded the agreement on October 17, and signed it on 
October 21.127  The four-page document was a carefully crafted agreement 
implementing the DPRK’s transition from graphite-moderated nuclear reactors 
to light water reactors.128  This transition was scheduled to take place over a 
decade, buttressed by substantial commitments from the U.S. to replace lost 
generating capacity through shipments of heavy oil.129  The agreement met 
resistance from some quarters as a “sellout and an act of appeasement.”130  
Others hailed it as a major achievement for peace on the peninsula.131 
B. Breach of the Agreement and the Current Situation 
As events have unfolded afterwards, it has become obvious that North 
Korea has materially breached the Agreed Framework.  In 1998, U.S. 
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intelligence discovered a large underground facility that could support nuclear 
weapon development.132  In a 2002 meeting with Ambassador Kelly, a North 
Korean official disclosed North Korea’s possession of nuclear weaponry, a 
statement later denied by Pyongyang.133 
Given the breach of contract, in November 2002, the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) suspended shipment of heavy oil 
and scrapped the Light Water Reactor (LWR) project.134  North Korea claimed 
the U.S. breached the agreement and stated that it must develop and produce 
nuclear weapons as a deterrent against potential American aggression, which it 
claimed to genuinely fear.135  North Korea then withdrew from the ongoing 
six-party talks—formerly involving itself, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, China, 
and Russia.136  The Bush administration has refused to engage in bilateral 
negotiations thus far with Pyongyang in an effort to avoid what it sees as 
blackmail.137 
V.  VARIOUS RESPONSES TO NORTH KOREA 
North Korea’s behavior regarding nuclear weapons has led many 
American sources—ranging from scholars and politicians to comedians and 
talk show hosts—to suggest that North Korea acts and speaks in a crazy and 
irrational manner.138  While it may be correct to speak about North Korea in 
this fashion if one incorporates a moral dimension to those statements, it is 
inaccurate in terms of whether or not North Korea’s behavior and speech is 
logically connected with its own goals and objectives. 
North Korean officials have the objectives of holding on to power, 
removing American involvement in the peninsula, reunifying Korea by force, 
and wresting benefits from other countries through the use of threats and 
coercion due to the deteriorated condition of their own country.139  
Understanding these goals will help one to make sense of North Korea’s 
actions—as insidious as many of these resulting activities have been.  Though 
 
 132. Id. at 222, 225; see also No Nukes Warning from Clinton to N. Korea, CNN.COM, Nov. 
21, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9811/21/korea.01/index.html. 
 133. See Kerr, supra note 11.  In 2005, North Korea publicly announced that it had already 
developed nuclear weapons.  Timeline, supra note 11. 
 134. Kerr, supra note 11. 
 135. See PINKSTON ET AL., supra note 12. 
 136. Timeline, supra note 11. 
 137. See PINKSTON ET AL., supra note 12. 
 138. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 14, at 155–58.  David Letterman, host of The Late Show, when 
discussing North Korea, frequently refers to Kim Jong-Il and his son “Menta Lee Il (Mentally 
Ill).”  James Brooke, Pop Culture Takes Aim at North Korea’s Kim, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 1, 
2005, at 2.  The recent movie Team America: World Police portrayed an ego-maniacal Kim Jong-
Il as the primary villain.  Id. 
 139. See Lee, supra note 14, at 154–57. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
534 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:517 
dangerous and seemingly desperate, the actions of North Korea are not 
irrational or illogical.  Perhaps the single biggest mistake made by the United 
States and South Korea in past dealings with North Korea has been to ignore or 
misinterpret this logic. This section analyzes past dealings in four major 
areas—military, political, economic, and ethnic—to show that past responses 
to North Korea have been inadequate or wrong-headed.  Then, it recommends 
better solutions for dealing in each of these four areas.  The Article concludes 
by focusing on potential solutions relating to international legal theory. 
A. Military 
1. Background 
As the preceding sections make clear, North Korea’s most obvious—and, 
for the world, dangerous—goals are militaristic: holding on to power in its 
totalitarian dictatorship, reunifying Korea by force, and extracting benefits 
from other countries through the use of threats and coercion.140  It should be no 
surprise that North Korea has doggedly continued with its belligerent and 
hostile actions toward the United States and South Korea since the cease-fire—
whether through naval battles with South Korea, frequent border skirmishes, or 
intentional incursions into South Korea with thousands of armed agents.141  
These actions have extended to Japan as well.142  Time after time, North Korea 
has persistently sought these aforementioned objectives, often in overtly 
hostile ways. 
2. Past Military Responses 
As noted above, the response by key countries such as South Korea, the 
United States, and Japan has been to reduce their military force relative to 
North Korea.143  Because North Korea’s goal is to unify Korea, by force if 
necessary, then such a response moves in the wrong direction.  For example, 
one devious way in which North Korea may seek to start a war is by having its 
own soldiers dress in South Korean military uniforms and pretend to invade 
North Korea; in response to this phony incursion, North Korea would then 
attack South Korea with the justification of having been “attacked” first.  
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Indeed, North Korea has actually engaged in military exercises practicing such 
a subterfuge.144 
3. Recommended Military Solutions 
A better solution would be for these nations to increase the defensive 
capabilities of their military.  The South Korean military should ready itself 
because the belligerent rhetoric of North Korea has sometimes spilled into 
combat.  Importantly, South Korea needs to have enough of a deterrent—
especially in terms of defensive measures—readily at hand.145  Such measures 
should discourage the outbreak of war and send a clear message to North 
Korea that they would meet vigorous resistance and ultimately find defeat if 
they instigate another war. 
Another option is for Japan to indicate that it will bolster its military in 
order to defend against the North Korean threat, which perhaps could motivate 
China to persuade North Korea to disarm.146  In recent years, Japan has taken a 
harder line towards North Korea, but so far has increased only its defensive 
and not offensive capabilities.147  If it looks like the United States is behind 
that effort though (as in the efforts of U.S. Rep. Tom Lantos),148 then perhaps 
it would not achieve the desired effect. 
Finally, the U.S. should at least send greater defensive reinforcements, 
such as more Patriot missile batteries.149  The emphasis on defense forecloses 
reasonable pretexts for North Korea to attack preemptively by considering 
buildup of offensive capabilities as an indicator of imminent U.S. attack.  
North Korea might try to claim that America is building up its military forces 
in and around the peninsula in order to attack North Korea: Pyongyang could, 
for example, draw analogies to the military buildup in Iraq prior to the first 
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Gulf war.150  However, primarily defensive reinforcements would at once take 
away such an excuse while preparing for a possible attack by North Korea. 
B. Political 
1. Background 
The North Korean pattern of brinkmanship or “negotiating on the edge”—
as Scott Snyder has put it in his book by that title,151 and as shown in a recent 
book on North Korean negotiation strategy—is in five steps: (1) escalate the 
crisis; (2) use it to gain bargaining leverage to get the desired parties (most 
particularly the United States) to the table, such as the Clinton administration 
for bilateral negotiations; (3) as a result of the crisis, to come to an agreement, 
which (4) gives North Korea benefits, which it swallows; and then (5) not 
abide by its promises, break the agreement, and create another crisis—thus 
starting this cycle again.152 
What must also be recognized is that deception and the breaking of its 
word have been the norm, not the exception, for North Korea.  In addition to 
deceiving the international community, North Korea pumps a steady stream of 
lies to its own populace.  Its propaganda states ridiculous things: that South 
Korea is in much worse economic condition than North Korea; the outlandish 
deification of the dictator Kim Jong-Il; the ever present threat of attack from 
South Korea and the United States; and the false promises that a communist 
utopia will come about if the populace just perseveres a little bit longer.153  
Also, North Korea levels a steady stream of wild accusations against South 
Korea and the United States that probably would better describe North Korea’s 
 
 150. See Drennan, supra note 10, at 190.  The U.S.–South Korean alliance has been and will 
continue to be a primary deterrent against North Korean aggression, so these two nations must not 
only continue but also must strengthen their ties.  Stephen W. Bosworth, U.S.–Korean Relations 
After the Summit, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 25, 27 (2001). 
 151. SCOTT SNYDER, NEGOTIATING ON THE EDGE: NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATING 
BEHAVIOR (1999). 
 152. See id. at 68–96; Hyun Joon Chon, Characteristics of North Korea’s South Korean 
Policy, in KINU RESEARCH ABSTRACTS ‘02, at 39, 40–41 (2003); see also LITWAK, supra note 
47, at 226 (quoting a former North Korean theoretician: “[North Korean officials] understand that 
there is no alternative to brinkmanship.”). 
 153. See, e.g., KIM IL SUNG, FOR THE INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA 
(1975); Li Jong Mok, Speeches to the United Nations (Oct. 21, 27, 29, 1975), in ON THE 
QUESTION OF KOREA: SPEECHES OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE 30TH SESSION OF THE U.N. 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1, 1–25 (1976); Park Chung Hee, Speech, North Korean Communists’ 
Deceptive Double Tactics (January 14, 1975), in TOWARD PEACEFUL UNIFICATION 110 (1976); 
Park Chung Hee, Speech, Peace Propaganda and Warlike Provocations (July 4, 1975), in 
TOWARD PEACEFUL UNIFICATION, supra, at 116. 
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actions and position than what either South Korea or the United States have 
done against North Korea.154 
One recurring problem involves North Korean efforts to negotiate directly 
with the U.S. while sidelining South Korea.155  Given the continuing North 
Korean policy that fails to officially recognize or engage in official diplomacy 
with South Korea,156 and continues on the path of seeking forceful 
reunification,157 there exist continuing tensions about how to conduct 
multilateral negotiations.158 
2. Responses to North Korean Deceit and Brinkmanship 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice recently responded to North Korean 
accusations that the United States is hostile toward North Korea and is about to 
wage war and attack North Korea.  Secretary Rice called such rhetoric 
ridiculous—that the United States has no war plans against North Korea 
presently.159  These recent accusations amount to nothing more than the 
continued spewing of the North Korean propaganda machine and the lineup of 
lies that it regularly puts forth to its populace.160 
 
 154. See SUNG, supra note 153; Kim Il Sung, Speech at Pyongyang Mass Meeting (June 23, 
1973), in KOREAN UNIFICATION: SOURCE MATERIALS WITH AN INTRODUCTION 340 (Se-Jin Kim 
ed., 1976).  Kim Il Sung refers to “the U.S. imperialist occupation of south Korea,” id. at 341, and 
accuses the United States of engaging in “machinations,” and “double-dealing tactics.”  Id. at 
342. 
 155. Lee, supra note 14, at 151–52. 
 156. The 2000 Summit remains an insubstantial anomaly that achieved greater support from 
South Korea to North Korea while ultimately giving South Korea very little; North Korea lost 
next to nothing by agreeing to the reunion of families, its largest “concession.”  See generally 
MARK E. MANYIN, NORTH–SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS: A CHRONOLOGY OF THE “NEW” 
DIALOGUE 1–2 (2001), http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30811.pdf. 
 157. See Lee, supra note 14, at 155–58. 
 158. For a more thorough discussion of the need for all six nations to be involved, and why no 
single nation should predominate, see Ilpyong J. Kim, The Major Powers and the Korean 
Triangle, in TWO KOREAS—ONE FUTURE?; A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS 
SERVICE COMMITTEE 119 (John Sullivan & Roberta Foss eds., 1987) [hereinafter TWO 
KOREAS—ONE FUTURE?]. 
 159. Joel Brinkley & Steven R. Weisman, Visiting Korea Base, Rice Sends Forceful 
Reminder to the North, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at 11. 
 160. See PINKSTON ET AL., supra note 12. 
For years, Pyongyang has expressed its desire to improve relations with the United States, 
while paradoxically issuing belligerent statements towards Washington.  For example, on 
February 2, 2005, the North Korean media broadcast a statement by a North Korean Air 
Force officer declaring that the North Korean military would turn U.S. military bases into 
a “sea of fire” if the United State attacked the DPRK. 
Id.; see also Glenn Kessler, Three Little Words Matter to N. Korea: Bush Has Avoided ‘No 
Hostile Intent,’ WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2005, at A10 (reporting that the Bush administration 
repeatedly states that it has no intention to invade North Korea, but backs away from the Clinton-
era phrase “no hostile intent”). 
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Although these actions by Rice indicate an awareness of North Korean 
tactics, other parts of our government do not seem to appreciate fully how 
North Korea operates.  Pronouncements by U.S. Representative Curt Weldon, 
who was part of a recent Congressional delegation to North Korea, appear 
overly optimistic.  Shortly after his return, Weldon claimed that North Korea 
anticipated denuclearizing.161  Not long after that press conference—within a 
matter of weeks—North Korea announced unabashedly to the world that it 
possessed nuclear weapons.162  Thereafter, U.S. Rep. Tom Lantos, the ranking 
democratic foreign relations committee member, in a speech at John Hopkins’ 
School of Advanced International Studies, drew a parallel to the example of 
Libya’s reaping economic and political benefits after it voluntarily disarmed its 
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.163  Such a prospect does not reflect 
North Korea’s past patterns of behavior.164 
3. Recommended Political Solutions 
While U.S. Representative Lantos acknowledged that it is a “long shot” 
that North Korea would follow the path of Libya,165 his words nonetheless 
indicate that members of Congress want to take a softer approach than the 
Bush administration.166  The present administration’s insistence on six-party 
talks, rather than bilateral negotiations directly with North Korea, helps to 
counter North Korea’s attempt to go over the head of South Korea—and for 
that matter, over the heads of its regional neighbors—to directly negotiate with 
the United States.167  Such bilateral talks, which led to the 1994 Agreed 
Framework, not only failed, but also gave additional time for North Korea to 
 
 161. Glenn Kessler, N. Korea Talks May Hinge on Bush: Lawmaker Advises Bush to Choose 
His Words Carefully, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2005, at A23; Jason Motlagh, North Korea: 
Denuclearization is Final Goal, THE WASH. TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 19, 2005, 
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050119-102012-8082r.htm. 
 162. Motlagh, supra note 161; see also Duffy, supra note 11 (reporting the North Korea’s 
February 2005 announcement). 
 163. Congressman Tom Lantos, Speech at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies, Is Libya the Future of North Korea? (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.sais-
jhu.edu/pubaffairs/SAISarticles05/Lantos_Speech.pdf  [hereinafter Lantos Speech]. 
 164. See id.; see also Henry Sokolski, The Qaddafi Precedent, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 26, 
2004, at 12, available at http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Writings; Adam 
Wolfe, U.S. Attempts to Make an Example Out of Libya Will Fail, PINR.COM, Apr. 24, 2004, 
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=163&language_id=1. 
 165. Lantos Speech, supra note 163. 
 166. With a new Secretary of State, it is possible there may be some variations from the prior 
Secretary in terms of how such matters are approached. 
 167. Lantos Speech, supra note 163.  U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Stephen W. 
Bosworth notes the advantage of multi-party talks over bilateral negations because the former 
build broad regional consensus that supports dialogue and cooperation between North and South 
Korea.  See Bosworth, supra note 150, at 25. 
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become more dangerous and to reap benefits without meeting its obligations.168  
The present administration’s approach, whatever its overall merits, at least 
avoids such blackmail. 
Lantos did parlay a tactic that might help the United States politically, 
although it may have helped even more had the speaker come from outside the 
United States.  Lantos had spoken to leaders in China and indicated that it was 
in China’s interest to see that North Korea disarm its weapons of mass 
destruction because of the possibility of Japan’s rearming to defend and deter 
North Korean potential aggression with such weapons.169  Given the history of 
hostilities that historically had transpired between China and Japan, China 
would not want Japan to rearm.  Thus, Lantos used the approach that former 
Secretary of State George Schultz had suggested would be an effective way to 
motivate China to step in to help disarm North Korea.170 
C. Economic 
1. Background 
If North Korea merely diminished its military spending by approximately 
five to ten percent, then it could potentially feed its starving populace; yet, it 
refuses to do so.171  It has preferred artillery, tanks, and fighter planes to rice, 
kimchi (Korean pickled vegetables), and kalbi (Korean style marinated short 
ribs)—thus deciding to be armed to the teeth while turning their populace into 
ragged skeletons. 
The Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) published an 
interesting empirical study that takes the factors used by Zbigniew Brezizinski, 
formerly prominent in the Carter administration and now a scholar in the field 
of international relations.  Brezizinski examined various factors to measure the 
degree of crisis within regimes in Eastern Europe to help to predict whether 
they would be experiencing impending collapse, transformation, regime 
change, and other similar events.172  KINU took the Brezizinski factors, added 
some of its own that it deemed appropriate to the North Korean context, and 
measured to what extent the North Korean regime is in crisis and the 
probability that it would implode.173  KINU’s conclusion, after analysis of 
 
 168. See Erik Raines, Note, North Korea: Analyzing the “New” Nuclear Threat, 12 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 349, 359–62 (2004). 
 169. Lantos Speech, supra note 163. 
 170. See Steven Kamara, Schultz ‘42 Discusses Solutions to Nuclear Threat from North 
Korea, DAILY PRINCETONIAN ONLINE, Apr. 14, 2003, http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/ 
archives/2003/04/14/news/7921.shtml. 
 171. See N. Korea: Starving for Missiles, CBSNEWS.COM, Aug. 13, 1999, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/08/13/eveningnews/main58131.shtml. 
 172. KIM ET AL., supra note 71, at iii. 
 173. Id. at 9. 
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political, social, economic, cultural, and other factors, was that even through 
1995—when the measurements ended—North Korea had already entered a 
crisis level.174  Many of those factors were on a downward trend, meaning that 
North Korea was degenerating, potentially leading to regime transformation or 
regime change if the trends were not reversed.175 
2. Incentives, Trade, and Humanitarian Aid in Response 
Ten years later, if one presumes that at least the majority of those factors 
have grown worse, then North Korea has grown closer and closer to imploding 
from within.  The initial implementation of economic free-enterprise zones 
may have helped to start to reverse its economic woes, but more likely, a 
greater factor in helping sustain North Korea, as was mentioned earlier, is 
increased trade and aid, most particularly from South Korea.  Two-way trade 
between South and North Korea had risen to $697 million by 2004.176  
Predominantly, the amount flowing from North Korea to South Korea was 
miniscule, but the numbers have been increasing since that time.177 
The head of Hyundai, one of the two giant conglomerates in Korea, has 
been funding various projects, including the Mount Kumgang tourism, as well 
as an entire industrial zone, various donations, and funds for infrastructure.178  
That type of aid from various South Korean sources has been increasing, and 
increasing dramatically.179  China is another major source of aid and trade, but 
Russia has diminished its aid to North Korea due to its own economic woes.180  
What must be realized is that North Korea only engages the international 
community to the extent that it thinks it can benefit from such interaction while 
continuing to pursue its own inimical goals.  While North Korea may have 
taken certain steps to increase its diplomatic relationships,181 the depth of those 
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 175. Id. at 126. 
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North Korea has sought to broaden its formal diplomatic relationships. In July 2000, 
North Korea began participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with Foreign 
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relationships extends no further than the instrumental pursuit of its own 
interests at best. 
North Korea claims that if it just gets sufficient humanitarian aid, then it 
would be sustained thereby.182  The root problem is more foundational, though: 
its economic system has failed.183  North Korea is, however, experimenting 
with economic free enterprise zones, which seem to be a step in the right 
direction as far as increasing production.184  It has remained, though, unwilling 
to cut military spending, which would free the necessary resources to be able 
to feed their country.185  The means to help its citizens, and the people inside 
North Korea, is within North Korea’s own grasp, but rather than increasing 
overall production, it has even cut food rations to a portion of its populace 
during the latter part of the 1990s.186 
Obviously, to help open up the society and the economy, North Korea 
should implement reforms that move towards a more free-market, capitalistic 
system that rewards industriousness, productivity, and enterprise.  It has made 
slight steps in that direction as mentioned, and trade, especially with South 
Korea, has increased dramatically187—even as it has evaporated with almost 
the entire rest of the world.  But North Korean so-called “trade” is more charity 
than anything else, where South Korea is helping North Korea, and getting 
little to nothing in return, except the continued animosity and hostility of the 
Pyongyang regime.188 
 
Minister Paek Nam Sun attending the ARF ministerial meeting in Bangkok. The D.P.R.K. 
also expanded its bilateral diplomatic ties in that year, establishing diplomatic relations 
with Italy, Australia, and the Philippines. The U.K., Germany, and many other European 
countries have established diplomatic relations with the North, as have Australia and 
Canada. 
Id. 
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19, 2005, at A1. 
 183. See Yang, supra 177, at 32 (comparing the 1999 per capita incomes and total trade of the 
two nations, when North Korea was at $714 per person and $1.48 billion in trade, while South 
Korea stood at $8,581 and $263.5 billion respectively). 
 184. See Brooke, supra note 178. 
 185. See N. Korea: Starving for Missiles, supra note 171. 
 186. See James Brooke, Threats and Responses: Asian Arena; Defectors Want to Pry Open 
North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at A12.  “In the mid-1990’s, during a famine, [a North 
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without bullets, you cannot survive.”’”  Id. 
 187. Yang, supra note 177, at 33. 
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Representative Lantos indicated that sanctions against North Korea already 
exist.189  One scholar suggests that U.S. economic sanctions against North 
Korea have not worked to force North Korea to change.190  However, these 
sanctions provide a bargaining chip that allows the U.S. to maintain a policy of 
containment and appeasement that at least keeps the crisis on the Korean 
peninsula from worsening.191 
3. A More Hands-Off Solution to Economic Development 
To promote change, however, a better approach would be, at the very least, 
continued containment and deterrence, where nations such as Japan and the 
United States—and especially South Korea—take the path of patiently waiting, 
and perhaps in some ways accelerating, an internal implosion: the demise of 
North Korea from within.  This would require nothing more than ceasing, or at 
least dramatically reducing, trade and humanitarian aid so that North Korea 
would be forced to negotiate more broadly—and more honestly.192  Current 
trade and humanitarian efforts are undoubtedly paved with good intentions and 
compassion.  However, they also help to reinforce a terrible regime, one that 
has miserably failed its people, so that such aid may be delaying the internal 
collapse of North Korea.  The one drawback is that North Korea may respond 
to economic reductions with military force; thus, South Korea and her allies 
must maintain a substantial military deterrent as outlined above.193 
One can argue that even if North Korea will collapse, it is better for them 
to collapse with better economic conditions in order to alleviate the burden of 
South Korea, as well as other nations and organizations that would help.  
However, it seems that given the determination of Kim Jong-Il and his regime 
to hold on to power at all costs, and to orient the whole regime to maintaining a 
grip on power rather than serving the common good of the populace, it is 
highly likely that aid to North Korea would only tend to increase the grip that 
Kim Jong-Il and his cronies have on the country, especially given the diversion 
of aid to government and military personnel rather than the peasants who need 
it most.194 
 
 189. Lantos Speech, supra note 163. 
 190. See Drennan, supra note 10, at 159. 
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D. Ethnic and Nationalistic Propaganda 
1. Background 
Hwang Jang Yop195 indicated that North Korea is seeking to foment 
favorable political conditions within South Korea.196  These efforts seem to be 
working on various different fronts.  For example, the current president and his 
predecessor, as well as many members of the South Korean legislature, have 
socialist tendencies,197 leading South Korea in the direction towards the failed 
communism that has been happening in North Korea.  From the government, 
there increasingly have been elements that have been favorable towards North 
Korea and its system—which is strange, given the domestic disaster that is 
North Korea, and the relative paradise by comparison that South Korea has 
become.198 
Additionally, according to the Seoul bureau chief of Time Magazine,199 the 
South Korean media is reluctant to report North Korean abuse and aggression, 
whether to Japan or to South Korea itself, but it is quick to trumpet stories that 
 
Oh, The Problem and Promise of Economic Cooperation, in KOREA BRIEFING: TOWARD 
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North Korean government.  See Hwang Jang Yop, Speech to the People of the Republic of Korea 
at the R.O.K. Agency for the National Security Planning (July 10, 1997), available at 
http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/1997/bg152.html#2 [hereinafter Yop Speech].  One of my law 
students translated for him when he addressed the U.S. Congress in 2004. 
 196. See Rang, supra note 195 (“Hwang’s main theme is that he came over to Seoul to warn 
of the ‘impending’ invasion from North.”) 
 197. See B.J. Lee, Is South Korea Socialist?, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 2003, at 44; Owen 
Rathbone, South Korea’s Socialist Face, THE AMERICAN DAILY, July 17, 2003, 
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magnify any real or perceived transgression of a soldier or any one else from 
the United States.200  There has emerged a naiveté combined with wishful 
thinking about the intentions of North Korea, and a willful disbelief of the 
bellicose intentions of North Korea on the part of a good number of South 
Korean youth, who never experienced the Korean War.  The Time Magazine 
bureau chief said when he visited the law school, at which I served as a 
founding professor, that the South Korean media tends to downplay or even 
ignore a lot of North Korean acts of aggression, whether it be sending 
submarines down to South Korea where spies emerge and infiltrate, or naval 
skirmishes between North and South Korea near the borderline, or North 
Korea’s wrongful actions against Japan, such as the kidnapping of innocent 
Japanese civilians conscripted into teaching North Korean officials 
Japanese.201  These stories receive relatively low or little press, whereas when 
anything seems even remotely like a U.S. soldier doing wrong, the headlines 
magnify disproportionately.202  Such reporting tends to drive a wedge between 
South Korea and the United States.  North Korea actively has sought to take 
advantage of, and deepen, any rifts or disagreements between these allies, as 
well as with other involved countries (such as Japan, Russia, and China).203 
In addition, South Korean media and other sources, such as books, have 
tended to demonize the U.S. while indicating attractive points of North 
Korea.204  These sources have helped to inculcate in the younger generations a 
sizable degree of anti-Americanism as well as pro-North Korean sentiments.205  
North Korea regularly seeks to implant anti-American and pro-North Korean 
propaganda in South Korea, and it seems that they have done so successfully to 
a large extent.206  As an example, North Korea likes to say that it has to liberate 
South Korea from U.S. imperialism and domination, and thus damages the 
pride of South Korea by, in essence, speaking of South Korea as if it were a 
colony under the thumb of the United States.207 
Recently, a professor at Seoul National University (considered the leading 
university in South Korea) who had taught sociology at the University for 
more than thirty years was discovered to be a North Korean spy after two 
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fellow spies were linked to him.208  These spies confessed that this professor 
emeritus had been a North Korean spy all along.209  North Korea has thus been 
able to infiltrate influential centers of South Korean culture, and the culture, 
sadly enough, seems to be swallowing more of the North Korean propaganda 
and other reinforcing messages.210  Ironically enough, such devious 
communication exists in South Korea because as a developing democracy, it 
allows incomparably more freedom of speech than North Korea. 
There are also appeals to Korean nationalism, such that the common bond 
of Korean ethnicity is touted as being more important than other pieces of 
common ground, such as the extensive common ground that the United States 
and South Korea share, both in terms of their inner relationship, but also the 
common ground in terms of their political systems.  North Korea is an entirely 
different sort of society economically, politically, religiously, and socially; 
there exists much more common ground, and much more of a relationship, 
between South Korea and the United States than between South Korea and 
North Korea.211  The South Korean media, a significant portion of university 
students, and now many government officials in South Korea who are 
sympathetic with the North Korean regime, see the United States as a big bully 
against North Korea and an exploiter of South Korea.212  These South Koreans 
say they see North Korea as one of us, “our people,” as fellow ethnic Koreans.  
For many, especially in the generations in South Korea who did not experience 
the Korean War, it is possible that affinities with the U.S. politically, socially, 
economically, and legally can be overshadowed by the common ethnic blood 
that is shared between North and South Korea. 
Playing into this misguided identity politics is the strong nationalism of 
Koreans as Koreans (not North and South Koreans) and a strong sense of 
ethnic identity that has not only survived many invasions, many attacks, and 
many attempts to dominate or even colonize it, but has grown stronger in 
resistance against outside attacks.  That being the case, they are susceptible to 
this sort of propaganda and rhetoric.  There are many in Korea, especially 
among the younger generations and the media, who want the United States out.  
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Indeed, that plays into the hands of North Korean propaganda, which says 
South Korea is not free and must be liberated by North Korea from under the 
imperialist fist of the U.S.213  This way of thinking and feeling plays right into 
the hands of North Korea, and if it was not for the deterrent of American 
military might, South Korea might have already been overrun by North Korea, 
and there would be a unified Korea under Kim Jong-Il and the totalitarian 
dictatorship thereof. 
The North Korean regime puts the entire society in a straitjacket.  It has at 
least ten known concentration camps, where political dissidents are tortured 
and executed,214 and a regime that has had many people literally starve to death 
or suffer greatly from malnutrition and starvation.215  North Koreans do not 
have the ability to socialize freely.  They have no freedom of association, no 
freedom of press, no freedom of expression, no freedom of speech, and no 
freedom of religion.216  The rights, freedoms, and privileges that Americans, 
and even South Koreans, can at times take for granted are non-existent in 
North Korea.  Since there is no freedom of movement either, a North Korean 
citizen cannot travel freely out of the country.217  It is an iron cage of a society 
with the canary inside wasting away—and certainly not singing. 
2. Responses, or a Lack Thereof 
Deep historic ties exist between South Korea and the U.S., given that 
South Korea and the U.S. have been close allies over the past half-century.  In 
fact, the development of the two Koreas is intimately linked to the influence of 
other nations.  Just as North Korea is an exaggerated version of Maoist China 
and Stalinist Soviet Union, through U.S. protection and investment, South 
Korea has developed into a much more free-enterprise, democratic, and open 
society than its northern counterpart.218  So there are extensive social, 
economic, political, religious, educational, and cultural ties. 
These ties ought not be taken for granted or subsumed under the anti-U.S. 
rhetoric barrage tilting the culture.  A solution would be for those in power in 
South Korea, and those in the media sympathetic to U.S.–South Korean ties, to 
promote the affinities between the two nations.  South Korea must learn that all 
it has received back from North Korea after it has provided extensive aid and 
economic investments has been continued hostility and an unrelenting 
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aggressive stance against it.  South Koreans need to know that they may be 
helping to sustain a failed regime, stoking the dying embers of that society.  
Whereas if South Korea were not subsidizing North Korea to the extent that it 
has, perhaps North Korea would have collapsed already.  South Korea may be 
unwittingly delaying the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula by virtue 
of their propping up of a malignant, totalitarian dictatorship. 
VI.  LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS TO NORTH KOREA 
Although the above sections point to facets of an overall approach to 
dealing with North Korea, this Essay climaxes with international legal and 
international relations applications, which would do well to consider the above 
context. 
A. Multi-party, Not Bilateral, Negotiations 
1. The Problem with Bilateral 
China and Russia, among others, have urged appeasement of North 
Korea’s repeated demands for a bilateral security agreement with the United 
States.219  Such a move would be inadvisable.  Hwang Jang Yop, the highest-
level defector from North Korea,220 indicated that North Korea still is intent on 
taking over South Korea and the whole peninsula (unification by force is the 
official North Korean policy still), and in order to do so, it seeks to take the 
U.S. out of the picture.221  The U.S. commitment to defend South Korea is the 
principal impediment for North Korea not to take over the peninsula222—after 
all, it was the U.S. forces, along with the United Nations and South Korean 
forces, which pushed back North Korean aggression during the Korean War.  
Thus, it would be a mistake to take Pyongyang’s insistence upon the security 
agreement with the United States as simply the paranoid delusions of a regime 
that anticipates U.S. aggression to dismantle the regime.  Rather, if Hwang 
Jang Yop’s diagnosis is correct, and he has the best and highest inside view of 
the regime available, it is a very calculated effort for the North Koreans to take 
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the United States out of the picture as far as defending South Korea on the 
peninsula.223 
A recent U.S. bipartisan congressional delegation claimed some success in 
speaking with the North Korean government.224  Apparently, in an attempt to 
defuse the North Korean nuclear deterrent reasoning for its nuclear weapons 
program, the U.S. delegation indicated that Washington did not seek regime 
change nor plan a preemptive attack.225  During this visit, the beleaguered 
North Korea reportedly offered to become a “friend” of the United States if 
Washington did not make inflammatory remarks about Kim Jong-Il’s 
regime.226  The North Korean government also stated its desire to resume 
“substantive discussions” according to Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) with no 
option “off the table,” including an end result of “giving up their nuclear 
capability.”227 
One should view this claim in light of North Korea’s history of mendacity, 
its obsessive effort to keep a grip on power, its past reaping of benefits without 
corresponding adherence to the obligations that it agrees to, and its continued 
goal to remove the United States from the picture on the peninsula.  Even the 
day after this meeting, the official, government-controlled newspaper 
(Nodohng Shinmuhn) continued its usual anti-American tirades, calling the 
U.S. a “nuclear criminal.”228  The North Korean newspaper, given the history 
of what has transpired thus far, appears more representative of Pyongyang’s 
actual stance.  While speaking against the “inflammatory” language of the 
U.S., it frequently resorts to inflammatory anti-American language itself. 
2. Multi-lateral the Preferred Course 
Although there have been multi-lateral talks in Beijing, they have largely 
consisted of recitations of each country’s positions, with no real progress 
toward an agreement.  The United States, North and South Korea, China, 
Japan, and Russia have attempted for months to set up a fourth meeting to 
pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons, a development that all the 
other countries sans North Korea claim to seek.229  The Six-Party Talks have 
thus far failed to make much substantive progress in resolving the current crisis 
on the peninsula.  For the most part, the delegates from each country have 
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reiterated their positions and stood their ground.230  There have been minor 
agreements as to the setting up of sub-committees that would address issues; 
however, no breakthroughs have yet emerged.231  North Korea indefinitely 
suspended the Six-Party Talks this year (2005) while giving conditions for it to 
return to these multilateral talks.232 
The effort to encourage North Korea to continue in the multi-lateral talks, 
however, is still a favorable one because it takes North Korea’s regional 
neighbors and applies international pressure upon North Korea to disarm.  
However, Russia and China have thus far taken a less than tenacious stance 
towards North Korea and its nuclear weapons.233  Yet the United States has let 
each country know that applying such pressure to North Korea would be 
desirable.234 
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, indefinite suspension by North Korea, 
and the absence of a breakthrough, this approach is better than the United 
States appearing to engage in unilateral efforts.  Accordingly, the present 
administration is doing a fine job of resisting the brinkmanship blackmail that 
North Korea again attempts to perpetrate.  Allowing North Korea to go straight 
to the United States, over the head of South Korea, seriously undermines South 
Korea.  If there is any bilateral action, it should first and foremost be between 
South Korea and North Korea, who after all live on the same peninsula in 
question, not North Korea and the U.S. 
China’s role could prove critical in resolving the crisis.  As North Korea’s 
best ally in the world, China’s strong insistence that North Korea denuclearize 
the peninsula would carry the most weight.  Whether China would do so 
remains in considerable doubt. 
Russia, which has recently renewed its ties with North Korea, while not as 
influential as China, might have some sway with North Korea.  North Korea 
still owes a sizable monetary debt to Russia.235  Russia could offer a measure 
of debt forgiveness as an incentive for North Korea to relinquish its nuclear 
weapons and program. 
Japan has aligned itself with South Korea and the United States.  It takes a 
firm stance that North Korea must get rid of its nuclear arms.236  Given North 
Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens and the sending of fraudulent bones of 
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one of them when the issue arose, some seventy percent of the Japanese public 
supports the levying of sanctions against North Korea.237 
B. A Role for the U.N. Secretary General 
These multi-party talks might benefit from outside assistance.  The U.N. 
Secretary General, currently Kofi Annan, could use his office as a mediator for 
multi-party talks.238  Passive attempts to make the Secretary General office 
available, as well as attempts to diminish tensions by visiting the respective 
countries, South and North Korea, have not helped in the past.239  Yet, when all 
U.S. attempts failed, the Secretary General used his office to negotiate the 
release of captured U.S. airmen after the Korean War.240  A role as mediator 
for an existing multi-party framework may help drive the talks. 
North Korea has stated, however, that it does not consider the U.N. a 
neutral party.241  The argument stems from the U.N.’s condemnation, and 
subsequent military action against, the North Korean aggression that started the 
Korean War.242  It conveniently ignores the aid that U.N. organizations have 
rendered to North Korea.243 
C. Implementing This Strategy 
Hwang Jang Yop also indicated that Kim Jong-Il is a coward, and 
capriciously changes his decisions based on his mood.244  If that is so, it is 
possible that a course of diplomacy that is incrementally increased to the point 
of actively going in and disarming North Korea at the last stage of this process 
might be the best thing—to call North Korea’s bluff and see whether or not 
Kim Jong-Il proves to be as courageous as Saddam Hussein was—darting from 
spider hole to spider hole and offering very little resistance to U.S. forces 
notwithstanding his inflated rhetoric. 
However, this would not be the first or even most desirable step in the 
process—it should come only if prior efforts fail.  A call for continued multi-
lateral pressure from other countries and international organizations, with 
resort as much as possible to international law, should continue—whether or 
not North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks.  Additionally, invitations to 
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North Korea to engage in negotiations either through the good offices of the 
U.N. Secretary General and/or to the multi-lateral Six-Party Talks can be 
extended to Pyongyang again. 
Step by step, the heat can be raised on North Korea, and as the heat is 
being raised, the drive for accountable ways (also known as CVID: Complete, 
Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement) 245 in which North Korea could 
indeed be disarmed can be pursued.  After the heat increases sufficiently, 
giving some positive incentives for North Korea to comply could increase the 
likelihood of a peaceful resolution.246  Both sticks and carrots (but sticks 
first247) can be incrementally ratcheted up, step by step, stage by stage, to the 
point where if none of these things work, only then would it be time for a very 
proactive international effort to disarm North Korea.  Such an approach seems 
to be the best means of dealing with the North Korean crisis because softer 
approaches have clearly failed repeatedly in the past. 
Giving positive incentives and a soft landing or a soft way out after turning 
up the heat and pressure might be much more persuasive to a regime that 
operates on the basis of fear and intimidation of its own people, as well as its 
regional neighbors, and indeed, the world.248  Along the lines of this 
incremental ratcheting up, it could include an agreement with specific resort 
upon noncompliance to the U.N. Security Council and the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), and whatever is maximally possible through the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).249 
Along these lines, it could then help to have U.N. Security Council 
resolutions (for example, through Article VI of the U.N. Charter)250 or other 
assertive action.251  The basis for such resolutions and possible sanctions can 
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lie squarely on the multiple instruments of international law that North Korea 
has violated.  Consider that it has broken every single major agreement that it 
has made, whether with other countries or international organizations, 
including the biological weapons convention,252 the cease-fire agreement after 
the initial Korean War,253 the 1991–92 agreements with South Korea,254 the 
2000 agreement after the summit between the leaders of South and North 
Korea,255 the 1994 Agreed Framework,256 the IAEA dictates,257 and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that it belonged to since 2003.258  Hwang Jang Yop 
explains how North Korea only enters into such agreements for tactical gain—
not with any intention to restrict itself based on legal instruments.259 
There is an interesting secondary role that the General Assembly can play 
if the U.N. Security Council is paralyzed by the abuse of a veto by, for 
example, China, who would be the most likely to veto actions, including 
resolutions or sanctions against North Korea.260  It can take the initiative to 
recommend action by the U.N. Security Council in such situations while 
passing resolutions of its own.261 
There should be international, not just U.S. verification of North Korea’s 
disarmament. Furthermore, there should be international assurance that North 
Korea complies with international organizations such as the IAEA, rather than 
ejecting the IAEA inspectors, as they did in the past.262  Otherwise, the 
acceptability and impunity of nuclear proliferation would be a message learned 
by other potentially dangerous regimes.  Ideally, it would be best if North 
Korea returns to the NPT—given that it was the first country in history to 
withdraw from it and disavow it in 2003.263  Regardless of North Korean 
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withdrawal from the NPT, there remains little doubt that they breached it while 
still a party to it.264 
Again, it is worth stressing that South Korean and U.S. military forces 
ought to put in place as many defensive measures as possible to deter North 
Korean aggression.  The United States must reaffirm a strong determination to 
defend South Korea.  What North Korea would perceive as U.S. weakness or 
anticipated non-involvement could prove catastrophic for the peninsula. 
In this whole process of external pressure, North Korea could come closer 
and closer to an internal collapse,265 in which case the possibility for 
reunification exists.  On the other hand, the threat of China perhaps stepping in 
and grabbing North Korea would then be a distinct possibility.  China, 
however, denies a desire in this direction.266 
There are various factors that have been correlated to increase the 
likelihood of success for the course of coercive diplomacy, and each of these 
can be applied to the North Korean context.267  Although each context is not 
identical to other contexts, certain analogies may be drawn. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
A situation as complex as the current North Korean crisis268 requires an 
understanding of history269 and context, a consideration of options and ideas 
from various angles (including legal), and courageous yet not foolhardy 
implementation.  The stakes could rise as high as not only another Korean 
War, but at its worst, even World War III, if countries such as China, Russia, 
Japan, and the United States all enter the fray. 
On the other hand, a successful resolution can build a bridge towards 
peaceful reunification, which could help considerably in stabilizing the region, 
stimulating growth and cooperation, and averting a horrendous cataclysm.  If 
the thoughts in this Article help move the situation towards greater 
understanding and resolution through implementation in even a small way, it 
will have fulfilled its primary raison d’etre.  If it at least gives more clarity to 
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the issues involved so that all concerned may see more sharply, then it was not 
written in vain.  While at best a work in progress as the actual situation 
continues to unfold, it aims to provide constructive insight into a very 
precarious, real life situation that cries out to be understood and addressed—
rather than ignored. 
 
